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ABSTRACT
We develop a real options model of R&D valuation, which takes into account the uncertainty in the
quality of the research output, the time and cost to completion, and the market demand for the R&D
output. The model is then applied to study the problem of pharmaceutical under-investment in R&D
for vaccines to treat diseases affecting the developing regions of the world. To address this issue,
world organizations and private foundations are willing to sponsor vaccine R&D, but there is no
consensus on how to administer the sponsorship effectively. Different research incentive contracts
are examined using our valuation model. Their effectiveness is measured in the following four
dimensions: cost to the sponsor, the probability of development success, the consumer surplus
generated and the expected cost per person successfully vaccinated. We find that, in general,
purchase commitment plans (pull subsidies) are more effective than cost subsidy plans (push
subsidies), while extending patent protection is completely ineffective. Specifically, we find that a
hybrid subsidy constructed from a purchase commitment combined with a sponsor co-payment
feature produces the best results in all four dimensions of the effectiveness measure.
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I.  Introduction 
There are three diseases, which kill more than five million people in the developing 
regions of the world. They are malaria, tuberculosis and African strains of AIDS.   
Multinational pharmaceutical companies have not devoted sufficient resources to develop 
vaccines for these diseases.
1  The reason is simple: those who need the vaccines most 
cannot pay for them.  As a result, pharmaceutical companies cannot justify undertaking 
expensive drug research for these small markets.  Aware of this problem, international 
organizations and private foundations have expressed willingness to provide funding to 
support vaccine research. There are various ways in which sponsor organizations can 
provide for these funds.  The literature on pharmaceutical R&D has provided qualitative 
discussions and anecdotal evidences on the effectiveness of different sponsorship 
methods.
2  In particular, sponsorship arrangements, which involve subsidizing 1. the cost 
of R&D investments (push) and 2. the income of the R&D output (pull) have received 
most of the attention 
  However, currently, there is no analytical framework available for analyzing the 
advantages and disadvantages of the different research sponsorship programs.
3  To fill 
this gap, we develop, in this paper, an R&D valuation model, which allows us to study in 
a more quantitative manner, the effectiveness of different research sponsorship programs. 
  R&D investments lend naturally to valuation by the real options method.  Pindyck 
(1993) provides a model for valuing projects with uncertain cost to completion.  The 
                                                 
1 See Kremer (2002a,b,c) for a comprehensive review on the problems of insufficient pharmaceutical 
research on diseases specific to the developing countries of the world. 
2 See Kremer (2002b,c,d), Hughes, Moore, and Snyder (2002), and Rey (2001) for more details on creating 
pharmaceutical R&D incentives. 
3 Glennerster and Kremer (2001) provide a discounted cash flow analysis for purchase commitments only.  
However the DCF analysis does not focus on the valuation of the R&D to the firm, but rather on the cash 
flows associated with the vaccine delivery.   3
innovation is the realization that the firm can learn about the difficulty of the research 
project as it invests.  Learning, in this setting, occurs through undertaking the R&D and 
incurring research expenses.  Consequently, the research effort provides double benefits.  
On one hand, it produces intermediate R&D outputs; on the other hand, it helps the firm 
determine the difficulty of completing the research project (the expected remaining time 
and cost to completion), allowing the firm to optimally abandon the effort if necessary.  
The learning and the option to abandon make the valuation problem different from 
standard valuation analysis.  Schwartz and Moon (2000) extend the analysis to include 
uncertainty in project revenue and the possibility of catastrophic events, which disrupt the 
research effort.  Miltersen and Schwartz (2002) further introduce strategic competition in 
a duopolistic market to the valuation framework.   
One crucial feature of the R&D process, the quality of the research output, has, 
however, been ignored thus far in the literature.  Traditionally, the literature abstracts 
from the quality variable to model, instead, an exogenous revenue process for the R&D 
output.  While the revenue from the R&D is certainly related to the quality of the R&D 
output, it is also predicated on the firm’s pricing strategy, which depends on the 
competitive structure of the product marketplace and the revenue subsidy or tax incentive 
offered.  Therefore, an exogenous revenue specification prevents the analysis of firm 
responses to different research incentives.  We address this issue by modeling the quality 
variable explicitly.  The revenue arising from the sales of the R&D output is then a 
function of the firm’s pricing strategy given the market demand and the subsidy program 
in place.    4
  We apply our valuation framework to analyze several incentive programs, 
reviewed in Kremer (2002b,c), for encouraging pharmaceutical R&D in diseases 
affecting the developing countries.  Using realistic parameters, we find that the small 
market problem is so severe that the granting of extremely favorable patent protection 
could not stimulate vaccine R&D.   
Push subsidy programs, which subsidize research investment cost, can induce 
research activities with low expected cost to the sponsor.  Full discretionary research 
grants can induce research at very low sponsor costs; however, they do not encourage 
high R&D intensity, resulting in disappointingly low probabilities of successful vaccine 
development.  Sponsor co-payment contracts, which require higher sponsor costs to 
induce research, produce significantly higher probabilities of successful vaccine 
development; co-payments represent the most cost effective contracts, studied in this 
paper, for increasing research output.  However, because the pharmaceutical firm retains 
the right to the developed vaccine under a push subsidy, the quantity supplied is lower 
than what is socially optimal, which results in low consumer surplus generated.   
Pull subsidy programs, which commit to paying high prices for the developed 
vaccine, are comparably more expensive methods for stimulating research.  However, the 
pharmaceutical company can be contracted to supply the socially efficient quantities.  
This feature greatly increases the benefit delivered per dollar cost to the sponsor.   
Moreover, a hybrid subsidy combining both a purchase commitment subsidy and a co-
payment subsidy delivers better results than either subsidy program can independently.   
Measured in the dimensions of sponsor cost, vaccine development probability, 
consumer surplus, and cost per individual successfully vaccinated, we find hybrid   5
subsidy contracts slightly outperform pure purchase commitment contracts, which in turn, 
significantly outperform sponsor co-payment contracts.  In addition, full discretionary 
research grants are largely ineffective, while patent extensions are completely ineffective. 
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follow.  Section II introduces the R&D 
valuation framework and the technique required for solving the valuation problem.   
Section III discusses the problem of pharmaceutical under-investment in research on 
diseases, which primarily affect the developing countries and illustrates this problem 
explicitly with our valuation model.  Section IV analyzes different types of R&D 
incentive programs that have been proposed in the literature.  Finally, section V 
concludes the paper. 
II.  A Model for Valuing R&D Projects 
In this section we develop a model for valuing general research and development 
projects.  We offer first a description of the R&D process that we have in mind.  This is 
then made precise when we formalize the model in the subsequent sections.   
Overview of the Firm’s R&D Valuation Problem 
We consider a firm with either a single R&D project or a portfolio of on-going R&D 
projects and R&D opportunities.  If the firm in consideration owns a portfolio of R&D 
projects, we assume that the externalities created by one project on the rest of the R&D 
portfolio is sufficiently insignificant to allow for the valuation of each R&D project 
independently.  Prior to engaging in the project, the firm assesses the expected quality of 
the final output of the R&D as well as the revenue associated with marketing the product.  
In addition, it assesses the expenses that will be incurred from the R&D and the   6
production of the product.  The firm then decides whether to undertake the new R&D 
project or not.   
The firm’s investment decision rule, however, is complicated by its option to 
abandon the project at any stage of the development.  As the firm commits its resources 
to research and develop the product, it also learns about its ability to successfully 
complete the R&D and to produce a quality and profitable product.  Specifically, at 
different stages of the development, the firm revises its expectation on the time required 
(and therefore the cost required) to complete the R&D, the quality of the final research 
output, and the revenue from bringing the product to market.  Based on the updated 
expectations, if continuing the R&D is unlikely to lead to profit, the firm abandons the 
project and cut its losses.   
The firm’s R&D valuation problem is, therefore, a “real options” problem.  The 
optimal abandonment policy in our model, which is not possible to solve for in closed-
form, is approximated very efficiently through the application of the least square 
procedure developed by Longstaff and Schwartz (2001).  Once the optimal policy 
function is solved for, the valuation of the R&D project is straightforward. 
We now introduce the model formally.  We present the timeline of the model in 
Figure 1 to help the reader visualize the firm’s R&D process.  For simplicity of 
exposition, we assume that the project is divided into 3 distinct phases.  Phase I and 
Phase  II represent preliminary and advanced stages of research and development 
respectively, while Phase III is the sales and marketing phase.  The generalization to M 
phases is straightforward.  In addition, the firm is assumed to make abandonment 
decision only at the beginning of each phase with the information acquired from the   7
completion of the previous phase.  This assumption is not crucial and can again be easily 
extended to accommodate less discrete abandonment policies. 
Rate of Investment 
For Phase I and II of the R&D, the firm is assumed to commit a constant rate of 
investment of I1 and I2, respectively, to the research effort.  In some cases, the firm may 
wish to change its rate of R&D investment as it learns more about the prospect of the 
project; however, for simplicity, we assume that I1 and I2 are exogenously determined and 
fixed through each R&D phase.  Under our current assumption, I1 and I2 are 
parameterized from the observed research investment intensities common for the type of 
project in question.  For example, if we wish to value a pharmaceutical vaccine project 
(which we do later in this section), we would estimate the rate of R&D expenditure for 
Phase I and Phase II by examining the industry average expenditures devoted to the bio-
chemical compound development and the subsequent stages of clinical trials respectively. 
Expected Time and Costs to Completion 
We now introduce the variables associated with the cost and the time for completing each 
phase of the R&D.  Let 
1 τ = the total (random) time needed for completing Phase I R&D, 
2 τ = the total (random) time needed for completing Phase II R&D, 
τ =  1 τ + 2 τ = the total (random) time needed for completing the entire R&D 
project. 
Further we define 
1() Kt= time t conditional expected remaining cost for completing Phase I R&D, 
2() Kt = time t conditional expected remaining cost for completing Phase II R&D,   8
() Kt= 1() Kt+ 2() Kt = time t conditional expected remaining cost for completing 
the entire R&D project. 
Since the rates of investment are constant, the R&D cost and the R&D time are one-to-
one mappings of each other; we can choose to characterize either  1 K  and  2 K  or  1 τ  and 
2 τ .  We choose to model the stochastic processes of the conditional expectations  1 K  and 
2 K , which is more natural in our context.   
We follow, in spirit, the modeling of cost uncertainty in irreversible investment 
projects described in Pindyck (1993).  The dynamics of the conditional expected 
remaining costs to completion are: 
11 1 1 () () dK t I dt dW t σ =− + ,  for 0 < t <  1 τ ,    (1) 
    22 2 () () dK t dW t σ = ,  for 0 < t <  1 τ ,     (2) 
and 
    22 2 2 () () dK t I dt dW t σ =− + ,  for  1 τ  < t < τ ,    (3) 
where dW1 and dW2 are Brownian motions and are assumed to be uncorrelated with the 
market portfolio returns, such that the true and the risk-adjusted process are the same.  In 
addition, the instantaneous correlation between dW1 and dW2 over 0 < t <  1 τ  is  dt ρ . 
The interpretation for equation (1) and (3) is straightforward.  As the firm 
continues to invest in the R&D, the expected remaining cost to completion decreases.  
However, the firm also learns more about its ability to complete the project on time and 
on budget.  Prior to the beginning of Phase I, the firm expects that the total cost to 
complete the Phase I research to be K1(0).  Negative shocks to the R&D delay the Phase I   9
completion and increase the total development cost for the phase, while positive shocks 
shorten development time and reduces the development cost.   
Equation (2), on the other hand, captures the idea that revisions in the firm’s 
expectation on the cost for completing Phase I research also brings about revisions in the 
Phase II expected cost to completion.  Unexpected delays in Phase I suggest that the 
firm’s resources in place may not be as suited for the development of the product as is 
previously anticipated.  This indicates that subsequent delays in Phase II are likely, thus 
raising the conditional expected Phase II cost K2(t).  Therefore  1 K  and  2 K  are modeled 
as joint diffusions over 0 < t <  1 τ  with an instantaneous correlation of  dt ρ .   
We note that the firm makes decision to abandon or continue the project only at 
the beginning of each phase.  Therefore, we only need to characterize the conditional 
expected remaining costs at these discrete points in time—namely at times 0,  1 τ , and τ .  
However, since  1(0) K  and  2(0) K  are exogenously specified and  11 () K τ = 0 and  2() K τ = 
0 trivially, we need only to characterize  21 () K τ . 
By definition,  11 () K τ = 0, therefore,  1 τ  is the first time the diffusion  1 K  reaches 
zero. The first hitting time density (which is not normal) of an arithmetic Brownian 
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4 For details, see Karatzas and Shreve (1991).   10
Similarly, for  2 τ , we have: 
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Since the firm invests with a constant intensity, the total realized research 
expenditure for Phase I R&D is  11 I τ .  The unexpected Phase I research cost is defined as: 
( ) 11 1 1 0 X KI τ =− ,       ( 8 )  
which can be expressed as: 
1
11 1 0 X dW
τ
σ =∫ .       ( 9 )  
Similarly, the revision in the expected research cost for Phase II is defined as:  
( ) ( ) 22 2 1 0 XK K τ =−,     ( 1 0 )  
which can also be expressed as: 
1
22 2 0 X dW
τ
σ =∫ .       ( 1 1 )  
Since dW1 and dW2 are correlated, we can decompose dW2 into two orthogonal Brownian 
motions and rewrite (11) as: 
( ) ()
1 22 2
22 1 2 1 2 2 1 0
1
11 Xd W d Z X Z
τ σ
σ ρρ ρ ρ σ τ
σ
=+ − = + − ∫    (12) 
where dW1 and dZ2 are orthogonal, and Z2( 1 τ ) is a normal random variable with mean 
zero and variance  1 τ .  Rearranging (10) and substituting (8) and (12), we have: 
   () ( ) () () ()
2 2
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Quality of Research Output 
We now introduce the variables that characterize the quality of the final research output.  
We define:  
() Q τ = the quality of the final product at the completion of the entire R&D 
project.
5   
We then define:  
[ ] () () t Qt E Qτ = = time t conditional expected quality of the final product. 
Again, it is only necessary to characterize  ( ) Qt  at times 0,  1 τ , and τ .  This time we do 
not model the stochastic process of  () Qt ; instead, we conveniently model  () Qt  as draws 
from a Beta distribution, which has support over [0,1].  This maps naturally into the 
standard intuition of product quality (and certainly seems more appropriate than 
unbounded distributions—for situations in our analyses).  A developed product, which 
falls miserably short of the specifications of the development objective, would have a 
quality index near 0.  While a product, which meets most of the specifications, would 
have a quality index near 1.  For a pharmaceutical vaccine development project,  () Q τ  
could be interpreted as the efficacy of the developed vaccine.  A vaccine, which is 
effective for 90% of the subjects being immunized, would have  () Q τ = 0.9. 
                                                 
5 We assume that this quality variable, being a technical factor, is also uncorrelated with the market 
portfolio and therefore the true distribution and the risk-adjusted distributions are the same.   12
  As mentioned before, unexpected delays in the R&D implies that the firm’s 
resources in place and its particular approach toward development may not be as suited as 
is initially anticipated—thus leading to an increase in the subsequent expected research 
expenditure.  The delay could also lead to a similar revision in the expected quality of the 
final product.  Therefore the mean of the distribution for  1 () Q τ  and  ( ) Q τ  could depend 
negatively on the shock delays occurring in Phase I and Phase II R&D respectively.  
Furthermore, the variance of the distribution could also depend on the amount of learning 
that can occur during the R&D.  If the firm does not learn much about its R&D prospect 
in the current phase, it cannot revise its expectation on the quality of the final output.   
The probability distribution of product quality can then be represented by the Beta 
density function: 
() ( ) ( )
1 1 , 1 ,    0 1,   0 ,   0
b a Qc a b Q Q Q a b ϕ
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However, the Beta distribution, due to the boundedness of it support, cannot admit any 
arbitrary pair of mean and variance.  Expressing the parameters a and b in terms of the 
distribution’s mean and variance we have:   13
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which give rise to the restriction: 
( )
2 10 QQ Q µµ σ − −> .       ( 1 9 )  
Therefore the dependence of the mean and variance on the other parameters of the model 
needs to be specified carefully to avoid non-admissible Beta distribution parameters.   
To allow for the probability distribution of product quality to depend on the 
realized cost (or time) of a given phase, we parameterize its mean and variance to be 
functions of the time to completion.  The specific parameterization for the mean of the 
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where  1 () i Q τ −  is the expected final product quality prior to the start of phase i, and  ,i µ η  is 
the response parameter to the unexpected delay in research time. 
Note that, for  ,i µ η > 0, the mean,  () Qi µ τ , of the quality variable is decreasing in 
the unexpected delay in research time, (
1[]
i ii Eτ τ τ
− − ).  When the realized Phase i research 
time  i τ  is equal to the ex ante expected research time, 
1[]
i i Eτ τ
− , ( ) Qi µ τ  is equal to the ex 
ante expectation  1 () i Q τ − .  However when  i τ  > 
1[]
i i Eτ τ
− , we have  ( ) Qi µ τ  <  1 () i Q τ −  and 
vice versa.  Finally, we note that  ( ) Qi µ τ  is bounded between 0 and 1.   14
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where  () () 1 () Qi Qi µ τµ τ −  is the maximum admissible variance for the conditional 
expected quality variable,  ( ) 1 () 1 () ( ) Qi Qi i s µ τµ ττ − −⋅  is the variance of the quality 
variable if there is no unexpected R&D delay, and  ,i σ η  is the response parameter to the 
unexpected delay in research time.  Note, 
2() Qi σ τ  is defined as a fraction of the maximum 
admissible variance. 
Consistent with the notion that the more time available for learning about the 
project the larger is the variance of the distribution of  ( ) i Q τ , the variance 
2() Qi σ τ  of the 
quality variable is increasing in the research time  i τ .  When the phase i research time  i τ  
is equal to the ex ante expected research time 
1[]
i i Eτ τ
− , the variance of the new expected 
quality () Qi µ τ  is equal to the ex ante variance  ( ) 1 () 1 () ( ) Qi Qi i s µ τµ ττ − −⋅ .  However, for 
, 0 i σ η < , when  i τ  > 
1[]
i i Eτ τ
− , 
2() Qi σ τ  >  ( ) 1 () 1 () ( ) Qi Qi i s µ τµ ττ − −⋅  and vice versa.   
Finally note that 
2() Qi σ τ  is bounded between 0 and the maximum allowable variance 
value  () () 1 () Qi Qi µ τµ τ − . 
Revenue from Sales of Product 
When the R&D is completed the firm must assess whether to bring the product to market.  
The revenue from the sales of the product will depend on the market demand for the 
product given the quality and the firm’s pricing strategy.  The firm, which is assumed to   15
have monopoly market power in this newly developed product through patent protection, 
would set the monopoly price associated with the market demand.  The firm is assumed 
to own the patent for the product for a duration T; after which the patent expires and the 
product marketplace becomes perfectly competitive, and the firm earns zero profit.  Other 
characterizations of the patent process such as the one described in Schwartz (2002) can 
also be incorporated in our current framework. 
  Since our model can accommodate any reasonable market inverse-demand 
function, we do not restrict ourselves to a particular form here.  A specific demand 
function, however, will be assumed in the later section to illustrate our valuation 
framework.  For the moment we assume only that the inverse-demand function,  () , PQq, 
is a function of the quantity supplied per unit time, q, and the quality of the product, Q.  
In addition, we assume a unit production cost function  ( ) , cQq.  The firm’s maximizing 








.       ( 2 2 )  
With the monopoly condition and the market inverse-demand function, we can solve for 
the monopoly price PM and quantity  M q .  The profit rate is then ( ) M M Pc q − ⋅ . 
  It would be straightforward to add a demand shock to this framework. A 
multiplicative demand shock following a geometrical Brownian motion would make the 
inverse-demand function stochastic.
6  Since demand shocks are correlated with the 
market portfolio, this state variable would have a risk premium associated with it and the 
                                                 
6 See for example Miltersen and Schwartz (2002).   16
true and risk neutral distributions would not be equal. To simplify our presentation we 
will not include demand shocks in our model. 
Catastrophic Events 
Finally, we introduce the possibility of a catastrophic event occurring during the lifecycle 
of the product, which discontinues the R&D effort or forces the product to be withdrawn 
from the market.  Catastrophic events may include 1. firm financial distress, which causes 
the project to be abandoned, 2. the departure of the lead scientists in the R&D effort, 3. 
the introduction of a superior product by a competitor, or 4. safety hazards created by the 
product which causes the product to be withdrawn from the product market. 
We model these events as Poisson processes with possibly different intensities, 
1 λ ,  2 λ , and  m λ , in the different phases.  As shown by Brennan and Schwartz (1985), if 
these processes are independent from each other and uncorrelated with the market (no 
risk premium associated to them) they simply enter into the analysis through increasing 
the discount rates.  Consequently, the effects of these Poisson events only show up in the 
discounting of the cash flows through inflating the discount rate by the hazard rate. 
Discount Rates 
For simplicity, we assume that the risk free rate, r, is constant.  As is usual in the real 
option literature, we discount risk-adjusted cash flows at r instead of physical cash flows 
at the risk-adjusted discount rate.  We have assumed that the R&D expenditure and the 
product quality processes described before are uncorrelated with the market portfolio and 
therefore have no risk premiums attached to them and therefore do not require risk 
adjustment.  A stochastic market demand function (which is necessarily correlated with 
the market portfolio) can be incorporated without much difficulty.  We need simply   17
adjust the  1 λ ,  2 λ , and  m λ  to reflect the appropriate risk premium associated with the 
revenue. 
Valuation and Abandonment at Time  12 τ ττ = +  
With the model now fully specified, we are ready to solve the firm’s optimal 
abandonment policy and the R&D valuation problem.  We start solving the model from 
the firm’s last decision node, which occurs at the end of Phase II (time τ ).  At the end of 
Phase II, the firm evaluates the time τ  discounted expected profit,  ( ) v τ , from bringing 
the product to market.  The required inputs for evaluating  ( ) v τ  are the patent life of the 
product and the firm’s forecasted monopoly rate of profit, associated with the forecasted 
market inverse-demand function  ( , ) PQq  and the unit cost function  ( , ) cQq.  Since the 
market demand function and the unit cost of production are assumed exogenous in our 







MM vP c q e d t
λ τ
−+ =− ⋅ ⋅ ∫ ,      ( 2 3 )  
where, again, the subscript M indicates the monopoly solution to the firm’s profit 
maximizing problem characterized by (22).   
Here, the firm’s optimal abandonment policy is simple.  If  ( ) v τ  is positive, the 
product is brought to market; otherwise the product is abandoned.  Note, that the firm 
chooses the quantity supplied optimally.  Therefore, we do not need to additionally 
characterize the abandonment policy since it is contained in the firm’s choice variable 
M q .  That is, the time τ  present value of the R&D project given the option to abandon is: 
{ } () () 0 () () Vv v v τ ττ τ => ⋅ = 1 ,      ( 2 4 )    18
where  { } () 0 v τ > 1  is the firm’s policy function (an indicator function) which takes on the 
value 1 when  () 0 v τ > , and 0 otherwise. 
Valuation and Abandonment at Time  1 τ  
Moving backward one decision node, at the end of Phase I (time  1 τ ), the firm decides 
whether to commence Phase II R&D.  Based on the progress made in Phase I, the firm 
now has a new expectation  1 () Q τ  on the final quality of the product and hence an 
expectation of the profit from the sales of the product.  The firm also has a new 
expectation K2( 1 τ ) on the additional R&D expense from Phase II development.  The firm 
would continue with the R&D if the time  1 τ  discounted expected profit  1 () v τ  (profits 
from sales minus the Phase II R&D cost), for continuing is positive.  We compute  1 () v τ  
by: 
   () ( )
2
22 2 () ()
12 1 2 1 0 () , ()
rr t vE V e I e d t Q K
τ λτ λ τ ττ τ
−+ −+ ⎡⎤ =⋅− ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ ∫ .   (25) 
The firm’s policy function is to abandon the project at the end of Phase I R&D if 
1 () 0 v τ ≤  and to continue with Phase II R&D if  1 () 0 v τ > .  The present value of the 
project at time  1 τ  is then: 
() { } 11 1 () 0 () Vvv τ ττ => ⋅ 1 ,      ( 2 6 )  
where  { } 1 () 0 v τ > 1  is the firm’s policy function which takes on the value 1 when 
1 () 0 v τ > , and 0 otherwise.   
However, unlike  () v τ , the conditional expectation  1 () v τ , which is a function of 
the state variables  1 () Q τ  and  21 () K τ , cannot be computed in closed-form.   Using the   19
Longstaff and Schwartz (2001) least-square numerical technique we can estimate an 
approximate function for  1 () v τ  very simply and rapidly.  With the approximated  1 () v τ , 
we can then solve the time  1 τ  R&D present value function defined in equation (26).  The 
additional benefit of applying a numerical solution is the flexibility it allows in the 
modeling of the market demand function, the unit cost function, the distribution of the 
conditional expected quality variable, and the stochastic process of the conditional 
expected cost variables.  All of the above functions and processes can be modified from 
what is assumed in this paper to model other R&D processes, and the numerical 
technique developed here applies regardless.  We describe the numerical solution 
technique in greater detail in the Solution Procedure section that follows. 
Valuation and Abandonment at Time 0 
At time 0, prior to beginning Phase I R&D, the firm bases it decision to commence R&D 
on its priors on the quality,  (0) Q , of the eventual product and the expected research costs 
K1(0) and K2(0).  The time 0 discount expected profit,  (0) v , can be computed as: 
() ( )
1
11 1 () ()
11 1 2 0 0 (0), (0), (0)
rr t vE Ve I ed t Q K K
τ λτ λ τ
−+ −+ ⎡⎤ =⋅ − ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ ∫ . (27) 
The firm gains  (0) v  in present value if it undertakes the project.  However, since the firm 
rationally foregoes the R&D when  (0) v  < 0, the value of the project to the firm is: 
() 0m a x [ ( 0 ) , 0 ] Vv = .       ( 2 8 )  
Unlike the time  1 τ  conditional expectation  1 () v τ , which is a random function of the state 
variables  1 () Q τ  and  21 () K τ , the time 0 conditional expectation  (0) v  is a constant and 
can be computed simply by evaluating the expectation.   20
Longstaff and Schwartz Least-Squares Solution Procedure 
We apply the least-squares technique developed by Longstaff and Schwartz (2001) to 
estimate the conditional expectation functions described in equation (25).  These 
conditional expectations functions are needed to characterize the firm’s abandonment 
policy functions, which are required to evaluate the R&D project.   
To proceed, we first simulate N independent paths (or evolutions) of the model 
state variables.  Specifically, each path j has three nodes labeled by time 0,  1
j τ , and 
j τ , 
with the associated state vector { (0) Q ,  1 (0) K ,  2(0) K }, { 1 ()
jj Q τ ,  21 ()
jj K τ ,  1
j τ }, and 
{( )
jj Q τ , 
j τ }.
7  Recall that  1
j τ  and 
j τ  can be simulated using the distribution defined in 
(5) and (7);  21 ()
jj K τ  can be simulated using the conditional normal distribution defined 
in (13); and  1 ()
jj Q τ  and  ( )
jj Q τ  can be simulated using the conditional Beta distribution 
with mean and variance defined in (20) and (21). 
In the sections below, we solve first for the firm’s policy functions.  After the 
policy function at each decision node is determined, the valuation problem simplifies to 
an exercise in taking simulated sample averages.  Throughout, we use v(t) to denote the 
present value of the project without the option to abandon at time t and V(t) to denote the 
value when the option to abandon exists.   
After the state variables are simulated, we work backward and examine, first, the 
present value of the R&D at time 
j τ  for each of the N paths.  As we mentioned before, 
the time 
j τ  present value  ( )
j V τ  can be computed using (24) and (23) without any 
complication.  After computing  ( )
j V τ  for each path j, we then proceed to compute: 
                                                 
7 Note that at the first node, all paths have the identical set of state variables { (0) Q ,  1 (0) K ,  2(0) K }; since 
no time has elapsed for the state variables to evolve.   21
() ( )
2
22 2 () ()
22 0 () ,
j
j rr t jj j vQ V e Ie d t
τ λτ λ ττ τ
−+ −+ =⋅ − ∫ % ,    (29) 
which is a point estimate of the conditional expectation defined in equation (25) (which 
we present here again for clarity):  
() ()
2
22 2 () ()
12 1 2 1 0 () ,()
j
j rr t jj j j vE V e I e d t Q K
τ λτ λ ττ τ τ
−+ −+ ⎡⎤ =⋅ − ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ ∫ .   (30) 
The  () 2 () ,
jj vQ τ τ % ’s are then projected onto our chosen basis functions to construct an 
approximate function for the conditional expectation. Note that these basis functions 
() () 11 2 1 1 2 1 () ,() ,, () ,()
jj jj
k fQ K fQ K ττ ττ L  may include higher moments, cross 
moments, logs and exponentials of the state variables.  The larger the set of basis 
functions we use, and the more judiciously we select the basis functions, the more 
accurate is the approximation.  To determine the coefficients on the basis functions 
selected, we regress the N (simulated) realized  ( ) 2 () ,
jj vQ τ τ % ’s onto these basis functions.  
The fitted value from the regression equation  12 1 ˆ(() , () ) vQ K τ τ  =  12 1 (() , () ) ' XQ K τ τβ  
(where X is the vector of the basis functions and β  is the vector of estimated OLS 
coefficients) provides a direct estimate of the conditional expectation  1 ()
j v τ .  The time  1 τ  
policy function is then approximated by: 
    { } ( ) { } 11 2 1 ˆ ()0 () ,() 0
jj j vv Q K ττ τ >≈ > 11 ,    (31) 
and the time  1 τ  present value of the project is: 
   () { } ( ) 11 2 1 1 2 1 ˆ ˆˆ () () ,() 0 () ,()
jj j j j Vv Q K v Q K ττ τ τ τ => ⋅ 1    (32) 
  To compute the time 0 policy function we need to compute first the point 
estimates for v(0):     22
() ( )
1
11 1 () ()
12 1 1 1 1 0
ˆ () ,() ,  .
j
j rr t jj j j vQ K V e I e d t
τ λτ λ ττ τ τ
−+ −+ =⋅ − ∫ %    (33) 
The same least-square projection technique is again applied to approximate the 
conditional expectation from a set of basis functions of the state variables.  However, we 
note that at time 0, the values of the state variables do not vary across the N paths; no 
time has elapsed for the state variables to evolve.  Therefore the regression trivially 
regresses the (simulated) realized  ( ) 12 1 1 2 2 ( ), ( ), , ( ),
jj j j j vQ K Q τ ττ ττ % ’s onto a constant.   
Consequently, the expected discounted present value at time 0 is just the mean of the N 
() 12 1 1 () ,() ,
jj j vQ K τ ττ % ’s: 
() () 12 1 2 1 1
1








=⋅ ∑ % .   (34) 
The time 0 policy function is then approximated by: 
    { } ( ) { } 12 ˆ (0) 0 (0), (0), (0) 0 vv Q K K >≈ > 11 .    (35) 
With the firm’s abandonment policy functions solved, we can evaluate the time 0 value 
of the R&D project by Monte Carlo.  Since we have created N simulated paths already, 




12 1 2 1 1 2
(0), (0), (0)
ˆ (0), (0), (0) 0 ( ), ( ), , ( ),  ,
jj j j j
VQ K K
vQ K K vQ K Q ττ τ τ τ >⋅ % =1
   (36) 
where: 
  () ( )
1
11 1 () ()
12 1 1 2 1 1 0 () ,() ,, () ,  ,
j
j rr t jj j j j j vQ K Q V e I e d t
τ λτ λ ττ τ τ τ τ
−+ −+ =⋅ − ∫
% %  (37) 
where: 
  () { } ( ) 11 2 1 2 ˆ () () ,() 0 () ,




22 2 () ()
22 0 () ,
j
j rr t jj j vQ V e Ie d t
τ λτ λ ττ τ
−+ −+ =⋅ − ∫ % .    (39) 
  We have assumed throughout the discussion only three phases in the project 
lifecycle.  However, the extension to a more general case with M phases is quite natural.  
The time 0 and τ  valuation and abandonment would remain identical to the procedures 
described above.  For the intermediate  i τ  valuation and abandonment, where i = 1 to M-
1, we then apply the same procedure described above for the time  1 τ  valuation and 
optimal abandonment.   
Illustrative Example 
In this section we illustrate our model by valuing a pharmaceutical vaccine R&D project.  
We simulate 50,000 independent evolutions of the state vector.  The parameters of the 
model are calibrated to demonstrate a realistic and interesting vaccine R&D in our fairly 
simplistic setting.  The model is certainly capable of accommodating more sophisticated 
assumptions, however, we refrain from extensions for the clarity of exposition.   
  We interpret the Phase I vaccine R&D as the bio-chemical compound 
development stage, where the pharmaceutical company develops bio-chemical 
compounds, which immunize against a particular infection.  Phase II R&D would be the 
clinical trials stage, where the vaccine is tested on human subjects to determine its 
efficacy and side effects and to ultimately obtain FDA approval.  We assume that the 
patent life of the vaccine is 15 years and is granted upon obtaining FDA approval.
8     
                                                 
8 We have also computed the project assuming that the patent life begins at the time of the patent 
application, which occurs just prior to the clinical phase for pharmaceutical products.  This patent process 
adds additional uncertainty to the revenue from the project, since the clinical phase may take significantly 
more time than anticipated.  However, this complication turns out to matter very little in the valuation of 
the R&D project.   24
For this example, the firm starts with a prior that its developed vaccine will be 
75% effective ( (0) Q =0.75).  Further, the expected Phase I development time is 2.5 years 
with an annual research investment I1 = 20 million dollars, and the expected Phase II 
development time is 4 years with an annual research investment I2 = 25 million dollars, 
implying  1(0) 50 K =  and  2(0) 100 K = .  We note that the investment intensity for 
medical R&D is often limited by how clinical trials can be conducted.  Applying greater 
R&D expenditure during the clinical phase would not materially improve the speed or 
result of the clinical trials required for FDA approval.   
The volatilities of the expected cost to completion process for Phase I and II are 5 
and 10 million dollars respectively.  We plot the sample density for the Phase I 
development time  1 τ  and for Phase II development time  2 τ  in Figure 2 and 3.  We note 
that the distributions for  1 τ  and  2 τ  show some right skewness, which is sensible since 
development time is bounded below at zero and unbounded above. 
The parameters, characterizing the evolution of the mean and variance of the Beta 
distribution for the expected quality variables,  1 () Q τ  and  ( ) Q τ , are selected to provide 
reasonable distributions for the vaccine R&D project.  The particular parameters for our 
example are  ,1 µ η = 0.2 and  ,2 µ η = 0.05 (which control the sensitivity of the changes in the 
mean of the quality variable to delays in the R&D time  1 τ  and  2 τ )  ,1 σ η = -0.2 and  ,2 σ η = -
0.05 (which control the sensitivity of the changes in the variance of the quality variable to 
delays in the R&D time) and  1 s =0.05 and  2 s =0.02 (which control the level of the average 
variance of the quality variable as a proportion of the maximum allowable variance).  We 
plot the time  1 τ  Beta distribution for the quality parameter for the median, the 90   25
percentile, and the 10 percentile path in Figure 4; and similarly for the time  2 τ  Beta 
distribution in Figure 5.  Observe that the conditional mean of the quality distribution 
diverges as time evolves, which captures the learning of the project quality over time.  In 
addition, the conditional variance decreases, which captures that the additional learning 
in Phase II R&D is less than what can be learned in Phase I R&D.  To further illustrate 
the evolution of the quality variable, we plot the corresponding unconditional sample 
density for  1 () Q τ  and  ( ) Q τ  in Figure 6 and 7.  We observe that the unconditional density 
of ( ) Q τ  has a greater variance than  1 () Q τ , which is intuitive since more is learned about 
the project at time τ  than at time  1 τ .  In addition, we also observe that both densities 
show strong left skewness, which is also intuitive since the support of the quality variable 
is between [0,1] and the unconditional mean is set at 0.75. 
We assume the following market inverse demand function: 
   
21 /
min max( ,0) PQ Q q
γ α
− =⋅ − ⋅ ,      ( 4 0 )  
with α =1500,  min Q =0.7, and the demand elasticity γ =1.2.  The market demand function 
indicates that the consumers are unwilling to pay for a vaccine with efficacy lower than 
70%.  Further, we note that the price response to efficacy improvement is quadratic, 
indicating a marginal willingness to pay that is increasing in the efficacy of the vaccine.  
This strong preference for a single effective vaccine may be realistic when we consider, 
for example, the cost and the inconvenience of requiring several less effective vaccine 
injections administered over a span of time to achieve the same immunization efficacy.   
We illustrate the elasticity of the inverse demand function with respect to the 
quality variable and the price variable jointly in Figure 8.  We observe that at high 
quantities, the market’s willingness to pay for improved vaccine efficacy is lower than at   26
low quantities.  At 18 million units supplied, the marginal consumer is only willing to 
pay an additional $2 per unit for the vaccine for a 5% improvement in efficacy (from 
80% to 85%).  However, at 4 million units supplied, the marginal consumer is willing to 
pay an additional $5.5 per unit for the same 5% improvement in efficacy.  The marginal 
consumer in the first case is presumably less able to pay for the vaccine than the marginal 
consumer in the latter case.  Therefore, our inverse-demand function suggests that people 
with less absolute wealth allocated for medical expenditures are also less able (or willing) 
to pay for higher quality medical treatments.  This is consistent with the health care 
expenditure behavior reported in Kremer (2002a,b). 
  Finally, to completely specify the firm’s problem, we assume a constant unit cost 
of vaccine production, c = $1.  This assumption is consistent with the observation that the 
variable cost of production for medical vaccines is usually very low. 
  We now compute the profits arising from the sales of firm’s vaccine (conditional 
on a successful development).  From monopoly condition specified in equation (22), the 
firm’s pricing strategy is: 








,  for  0.7 Q > ,  (41) 
so the price of the vaccine, if it is marketed, would be $6 per unit, regardless of the 
efficacy; the efficacy of the vaccine affects only the quantity demanded: 
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,  for  0.7 Q > .   (42) 
We then solve for the present value of the R&D project at time  1 τ  ( 1 () V τ ).  The set of 
basis functions that we employ in this example include polynomials up to the third degree 
of the two state variables  21 () K τ  and  1 () Q τ .  We plot the surface diagram for  1 () V τ  in   27
the Figure 9.  The abandonment region for the parameters ( 1 () Q τ , 21 () K τ ) is the region 
where  1 () V τ  takes on the value 0.   
We examine the impact of the abandonment decision on the probability of 
successful vaccine development as well as the distribution of the quality parameter in the 
following plots.  From the probability density functions presented in Figure 10.1 and 
Figure 10.2, roughly 53% of all R&D projects would be abandoned at the end of Phase I.  
From the PDF’s presented in Figure 10.3 and figure 10.4, we find for the projects that are 
continued into Phase II, only an additional 1.5% of them are expected to be abandoned.   
In our particular example, the firm expects to produce and sell 8.97 million 
vaccines worldwide per year.  The expected efficacy of the marketed vaccine is 83.97%.  
The present value of the R&D project is 2.16 million dollars. 
  It is interesting to note that given our inverse demand function, a vaccine with an 
expected efficacy near 75%, at time  1 τ , would not be profitable; observe in Figure 10.2, 
the minimum  1 () Q τ  that is not abandoned appears to be just above 75%.  Why then does 
the firm undertake the project, considering the expected quality of its vaccine at time 0 is 
only 75% efficacy?  More surprisingly, why is the project positive present value?  We 
begin by pointing out that the marketed vaccine has an efficacy substantially higher than 
what the firm, at time 0, expects to be able to achieve and substantially higher than the 
minimum efficacy required by the market.  The twin observations should not be 
surprising if we realize that the firm has the option to discontinue the project prior to 
completion when the prospect of success is low.  Therefore the R&D is only continued if 
the expected efficacy is above a threshold, which in our case is substantially higher than 
the minimum vaccine efficacy demanded by consumers.  In the table below, we show the   28
probability of the R&D project advancing to Phase II R&D and entering production as 
well as the expected qualities.  
     _________________________________________________________ 
Probability of advancing to Phase II R&D = 46.75% 
 
Probability of developing a successful vaccine = 45.19% 
 
Expected final efficacy (Q) of a successful vaccine = 83.97% 
   _________________________________________________________ 
 
We see that 53.25% of all the commenced vaccine projects are abandoned after Phase I 
results have been ascertained.  The average efficacy of the continued project is 83.4 %.  
After Phase II R&D, only an additional 1.56% of the projects are abandoned, while the 
rest goes into production. 
III.  The Market for Vaccines 
Malaria, tuberculosis, and African strains of AIDS are reported to kill almost five million 
people each year.  However, pharmaceutical companies have devoted few resources to 
research vaccines for these diseases.  The World Health Organization (WHO) reports in 
1996 that 50 percent of the global health R&D is undertaken by private pharmaceutical 
firms.
9  However, less than five percent of the total private heath R&D is geared toward 
diseases, which specifically affect the under-developed and thus poorer regions of the 
world.  Pecoul, Chirac, Trouiller and Pinel (1999) report that less than 0.4% of the 
licensed drugs in the last quarter century are for tropical diseases which affect primarily 
the African, Latin American and South East Asian countries.   
  The lack of private pharmaceutical R&D for diseases affecting under-developed 
countries arise from the difficulty of marketing drugs profitably in these poorer regions of 
                                                 
9 The government-sponsored research are usually basic research that are not expected to produce consumer 
market health care products.   29
the world, where the per capita income is often less than 1/100
th of the U.S. per capita 
income and where the per capita annual heath care expenditure is $18 compared to more 
than $4000 for the U.S.  Kremer (2000) reports that a $250 million annual market is 
needed to justify pharmaceutical firms to undertake research to develop cures, under the 
current patent regulation.  These revenues are simply not attainable from drugs targeted at 
diseases specific to poor countries.   
We illustrate this problem explicitly in the valuation framework we developed in 
Section II.  Using model parameters identical to the example given in Section II, we 
consider the value of a pharmaceutical R&D project with the following inverse-demand 
function:   
21 / 1 . 8 200 max( 0.7,0) PQ q
− =⋅ − ⋅      ( 4 3 )  
Namely, we increase the market’s demand elasticity γ  (from 1.2 to 1.8) and shift the 
demand downward (by reducing the constant scalar from 1500 to 200) to capture the 
observation that people living in the developing regions of the world are simply unable or 
unwilling to pay for vaccines at a price, which would make the vaccine R&D profitable 
to the pharmaceutical company.  Applying the valuation method developed in Section II 
to a calibrated example of vaccine R&D, we find that undertaking the vaccine research 
would result in significant losses for the pharmaceutical company.     
  World organizations are interested in solving the pharmaceutical under-
investment problem described above.  The World Bank announced in 2000 plans to 
establish a $1 billion fund to subsidize the purchases of vaccines for developing 
countries.  The U.S. budget plan for 2000 included a ten year $1 billion tax credit 
incentive program for pharmaceutical companies supplying vaccines to developing   30
countries.  However, the effectiveness of these subsidy programs has been questioned.  
Kremer (2002a,b) documents spectacular failures of numerous sponsored R&D projects.  
Moral hazard and adverse selection problems are prevalent, sometimes rendering subsidy 
programs completely ineffective.  How to effectively administer the subsidy and monitor 
the progress of the R&D effort are important questions to be answered.  However, the 
difficulty in creating the right subsidy program may lie at an even more fundamental 
level.  There is in fact an absence of a convenient framework to contrast the effectiveness 
of the different types of subsidy programs and to determine the required level of subsidy 
to produce the desired level of R&D activity.  We address the latter issue explicitly in the 
next section by studying different popular incentive programs within our valuation 
framework.  We refrain largely from analyzing the issues of moral hazard and adverse 
selection and only comments briefly on their impact when the analysis permits.  
IV.  Research Incentive Designs 
In this section we compare different R&D incentive designs.  Specifically, the study 
focuses on two main categories of incentive programs that have been proposed in the 
policymaking arena to encourage pharmaceutical vaccine research.  The two types of 
incentives programs, the push and the pull incentive programs, are analyzed below to 
determine their costs to the sponsors and their contribution to social welfare. 
 The  push incentive program spurs vaccine development by reducing the cost of 
the R&D to the developer.  The cost subsidy may take on the form of full or partial 
discretionary research grants or awards, where funds are awarded to the developer to 
reimburse expenses, or as co-payments plans, where the sponsor pays for a fixed fraction 
of the firm’s total R&D expenditure.  The pull incentive program spurs research by   31
increasing the revenue generated by the developed vaccine.  The revenue subsidy can 
occur as price (and quantity) commitments from the sponsor, where the sponsor and the 
developer agree to a price schedule for the vaccine prior to development, or as special 
patent extensions, where the developer is granted patent protection beyond the usual 
length of time for pharmaceutical vaccines.  
  We limit our analysis of the push program to the full discretionary award, where 
the money is disbursed upfront immediately, and the co-payment plan.  For the pull 
program, we consider separately the patent extension plan and the purchase commitment 
plan.  We also consider, in addition, hybrid plans which combine revenue subsidy with 
sponsor co-payment.  Throughout the analysis, we seek to answer four critical questions.  
1. What is the expected total cost of the incentive program to the sponsor?  2. What is the 
probability that a viable vaccine will be developed?   3. What is the expected consumer 
surplus generated?  4. What is the expected cost per individual successfully vaccinated?  
In particular, in answering the last question, we develop a new summarizing measure 









,      ( 4 4 )  
where again,  () Q τ  is the efficacy of the developed vaccine, q is the units of vaccination 
supplied per year, and T is the number of years that the subsidy contract is in effect.  The 
CPISV measure allows us to compare across subsidy plans that have different expected 
sponsor costs since it quantifies cost per unit of benefit delivered.  More importantly, it 
defines vaccine benefit differently from consumer surplus.  Note that consumer surplus 
measures benefit (or welfare) by the consumer’s dollar valuation of his consumption; this 
measure ignores the large positive externality created by a successful vaccination.  In   32
contrast,  CPISV measures vaccine benefit as the expected number of successful 
vaccination, which assumes tacitly that each life saved is equally valuable and that each 
successful vaccination provides identical external benefit to the society in terms of 
stemming the infectious disease. 
  In the analysis we abstract from agency problems arising from asymmetric 
information between the vaccine developer and the sponsor.  For example, we assume 
that subsidies are actually invested in the vaccine project and not diverted to other use.  
We also abstract from contracting issues, such as enforceability and renegotiation, related 
to purchase commitment plans. 
We begin by introducing the exogenous environment.   We continue with the 
example presented in section III, which is used to illustrate under-investment in 
pharmaceutical R&D for diseases specific to poorer countries.  In our specific example, 
engaging in the proposed vaccine research would imply an expected loss in present value 
to the firm.  A sponsored subsidy program would therefore be needed to induce the 
vaccine R&D. 
To help us contrast the different subsidy programs clearly, we assume throughout 
that the firm retains the right to the developed vaccine.  The firm is also allowed to 
abandon the R&D project when it determines that further development would not be 
profitable even with the agreed subsidy.  We do not consider subsidy programs, which 
transfer the ownership of the vaccine and the vaccine development process to the 
sponsor, because, in general, public agencies lack the expertise to own, manage, and 
distribute pharmaceutical resources effectively.  Our aim is to solve the pharmaceutical 
market failure in the poor countries by offering the proper level of incentives.    33
In the sections that follow, we first describe the specifics of each subsidy contract 
considered in our analysis.  We then characterize the pharmaceutical research outputs 
induced by these subsidy contracts. 
Push subsidy programs 
a.  Full discretionary award 
We first consider the most simple-minded cost subsidy contract—the full discretionary 
award.  Under this contract, the sponsor awards a research grant to offset the firm’s cost 
in the initial phase of the R&D.  The vaccine developer, however, could abandon the 
R&D effort after Phase I if further investment in the project would not lead to profit.  Full 
discretionary research grants are not unusual despite their potential for abuse.  In 
particular, government sponsored research grants are often of this nature. 
b.  Investment cost co-payment plan 
We then introduce the sponsor co-payment plan.  The plan assumes that the sponsor pays 
for X fraction of the firm’s per period research investment cost.  That is, the firm incurs 
only (1-X) I1 and (1-X) I2 in research cost per period in Phase I and II respectively, 
instead of I1 and I2.  Again, the firm is free to abandon the research effort when and if it 
sees fit.  Similar to the full discretionary award, the sponsor co-payment plan encourages 
innovation in vaccine development by reducing the cost of research. 
Pull subsidy programs  
Kremer (2002b) concludes that pull subsidy programs would be more effective because it 
largely eliminates the agency issues between the sponsor and the vaccine developer.  We 
illustrate in the analysis below that pull subsidy programs have many other advantageous   34
attributes over push subsidy programs.  However, not all pull subsidy programs can be 
effective, and different contract designs can achieve different sponsor objectives.   
c.  Patent extension program 
The patent extension program is the most widely used pull subsidy for encouraging 
innovations in general.  Some economists and policy activists have argued that 
strengthening patent protections or extending patent lives for pharmaceutical products in 
under-developed countries would improve firms’ incentive to conduct research on 
diseases specific to the developing countries (Kremer 2002b).  There is little doubt that 
better patent protection and longer patent life would improve the firm’s expected revenue 
from the developed vaccine.  However, does this mechanism deliver enough incentives?  
We analyze the patent extension program in this section.  Specifically, we assume that the 
sponsor can grant the pharmaceutical company extra patent protection beyond what is 
allowed under the current international patent agreement.  The increase in patent 
protection allows the firm to enjoy monopoly power for an additional period of time, 
leading to increased revenue from the R&D project.   
d.  Purchase commitment plan 
Next, we analyze the purchase commitment plan.  We assume that the sponsor commits 
to a quantity-price purchase schedule with the vaccine developer.  Under this price 
subsidy plan, the cost side of the vaccine R&D to the pharmaceutical firm remains 
unaffected, while the revenue side is altered by the purchase commitment.   
Under the purchase commitment plan, the sponsor observes the quality of the 
firm’s developed vaccine at time τ .  It then determines the socially optimal units of 
vaccine to purchase from the pharmaceutical firm; the quantity that the pharmaceutical   35
company is contracted to deliver is then only dependent on  ( ) Q τ .  Lastly, it supplies the 
vaccine to the target countries at the pharmaceutical firm’s unit cost of production c
10.  
The sponsor must design and commit to a price contract to induce the pharmaceutical 
firm to engage in research.  In the sections that follow, we study how different price 
contracts can lead to different firm behaviors and outcomes.  We limit our analysis to a 
few types of price contracts.  Extending the contract space beyond what is presented here 
would be easy to do, but would not contribute to our understanding of the salient features 
of the purchase commitment plan. 
The distinguishing feature of the purchase commitment plan is that the sponsor is 
able to dictate the supply of the developed vaccine.  With the discretionary award or co-
payment plan, the firm chooses to supply the monopoly quantity associated with the 
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  Under a purchase commitment subsidy, however, the firm gives up its right to 
extract monopoly rent in exchange for a purchase commitment at above market prices.  
The firm is contracted to supply the socially efficient quantity  c q , which is characterized 
by the quantity such that the market-clearing price is equal to the marginal unit cost of 
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10 For concreteness, here we assume that the sponsor sells the vaccine at the marginal cost c.  The analysis 
extends to any other sale price (or price schedule) including a price of 0.   36
d.1.  Purchase commitment with a constant price schedule 
We first analyze the simplest price contract—the constant price constract.  Here the 
sponsor is assumed to offer a fixed price P for any vaccine with an efficacy above the 
minimum efficacy demanded by the market (70%).  The revenue per year received by the 
developer is therefore equal to  c Pq ⋅ , where  c q  is defined in (46).  Since, the sponsor is 
assumed to supply the vaccine to developing countries at the marginal cost of production 
for the vaccine, it incurs a loss of (P - c) per unit of vaccine supplied.  However, in the 
event that the vaccine research is unsuccessful, the sponsor would incur no expenses. 
  As we noted above, the constant price contract does not reward the developer 
directly for the efficacy of the vaccine.  However, the firm is rewarded indirectly with a 
larger vaccine order, since the competitive quantity  c q  defined in (46) does depend on the 
efficacy.  As a result, the profit for the firm increases with the efficacy of the developed 
vaccine.   
d.2.  Purchase commitment with a variable price schedule 
We further consider a more complicated purchase commitment contract, where the price 
offered to the firm depends on the efficacy of the vaccine supplied.  One possible variable 
purchase contract is specified below: 
     () min max ,0 Pcw QQ
δ =+⋅ −  ,       (47) 
where w is a constant parameter specified ex ante by the sponsor to target expected cost, 
δ is a parameter that describes the price sensitivity to the efficacy of the vaccine, and the 
constant  c is added to ensure that a viable vaccine receives a price greater than the 
marginal cost of production.  For the analysis presented below, we use a sensitivity   37
parameter of 0.25.  We note that the price schedule specified is chosen ad hoc; the 
analysis, of course, can be performed in conjunction with other specifications.   
Analysis of the Subsidy programs 
We use the valuation model developed to help us characterize the research output 
induced under different sponsorship contracts.  The more interesting statistics are 
summarized in Table 1 and Table 2.  In Table 1, the different push and pull contracts are 
specified such that the pharmaceutical company is just willing to undertake the vaccine 
R&D under the proposed subsidy program.  Table 1 helps us assess the cost of inducing 
research under each subsidy contract.  In Table 2, the push and pull contracts are 
specified such that the expected cost to the sponsor is 80 million USD.  Table 2 is helpful 
for comparing the benefits created by the different subsidy contracts per expected dollar 
expenditure. 
  We do not report the results for the patent extension plan because it is completely 
ineffective at solving the small market problem on hand.  Applying our valuation 
technique we find that extending the patent protection to 1000 years does little to improve 
the value of the vaccine R&D; even under the most favorable patent protection, no 
developer would undertake this vaccine R&D.  While increasing patent protection might 
be the cheapest way (in a fiscal sense only) for the sponsor to provide incentives for 
vaccine R&D, it is also completely effective method at solving this pharmaceutical 
under-investment problem. 
Cost to the Sponsor—From the Sponsor PV Cost reported in Table 1, we see that the full 
discretionary award is the cheapest subsidy for spurring vaccine R&D, followed by the 
co-payment plan and then by the constant price purchase commitment plan and finally by   38
the variable price purchase commitment plan.  The cost subsidy programs appear to 
provide the fiscally cheaper solution to the under-investment problem than the price 
subsidy programs.  In particular, a full discretionary award represents the cheapest 
solution.  However, from the Probability of Successful Development reported in Table 1, 
we also see that a full discretionary award does not encourage high research intensity, 
leading to very little R&D output (only 3.46% chance of developing a successful 
vaccine).  Upon further inspection we find that the benefits produced by the subsidy 
contracts, in terms of consumer surplus and vaccine quantities supplied are increasing in 
the expected sponsor costs.  This makes contract comparison difficult, when both fiscal 
and social considerations are important.  We look instead, then, at Table 2, which holds 
the cost to the sponsor constant, to help us compare the effectiveness of the subsidy 
contracts.  
Probability of Successful Vaccine Development—From Table 2, we see that the co-
payment plan produces the greatest probability for producing a viable vaccine, followed 
by the variable price and the fixed price purchase commitment plan.  As alluded to 
before, the full discretionary award produces the lowest probability for producing a 
successful vaccine.  Under the co-payment plan the pharmaceutical company has the 
incentive, at time  1 τ , to continue an R&D project that has a low expected final quality 
1 () Q τ , because it does not fully internalize the cost of Phase II R&D
11; not surprisingly 
the co-payment plan reports the highest probability (58.56%) of entering Phase II 
development.  Ultimately, this leads to significantly higher probability of developing a 
successful vaccine.  On the other hand, under the full discretionary award, the firm must 
                                                 
11 The developer, under this plan, pays only 3.48% of the total R&D cost.   39
internalize the entire Phase II R&D cost.  Therefore, it continues with R&D only if  1 () Q τ  
is very high, resulting in a probability of only 3.47% that the research is continued into 
Phase II development.   
Under a purchase commitment plan, the pharmaceutical company must internalize 
the full cost of the R&D also.  However, the firm chooses to bear the cost of Phase II 
R&D even when  1 () Q τ  is low because the potential payoff from a viable vaccine is large 
due to the price subsidy.  The two purchase commitment contracts, nonetheless, elicit 
different behaviors from the vaccine developer.  Under the variable price purchase 
commitment plan, a high efficacy vaccine is rewarded with a higher price.  By contrast, 
the constant price purchase commitment plan offers the same price for vaccines, which 
exceed the 70% minimum efficacy requirement.  Therefore, under the variable price 
contract, there is a substantially higher upside if the firm can produce a high quality 
vaccine.  The higher upside makes the firm more willing to continue with a lower quality 
project, resulting in a higher probability of the R&D entering Phase II and therefore a 
greater probability of eventually developing a successful vaccine.  
Number of People Vaccinated—From Table 2 we find that the variable price purchase 
commitment produces the largest expected units of vaccine supplied, followed by the 
constant price purchase commitment, the co-payment plan, and finally the full 
discretionary award.  The difference in the quantity supplied under a cost subsidy 
contract and a price subsidy contract is intuitive.  Recall that the vaccine quantity 
supplied, under a cost subsidy program, is the monopoly quantity; while the quantity 
supplied, under a price subsidy program, is the competitive quantity.  The difference in 
the average quantity supplied for the full discretionary award and the co-payment plan is   40
due only to the probability of developing a successful vaccine.  This is similarly true for 
the variable price vs. the constant price purchase commitment plan. 
Consumer Surplus and Cost Per Successful Immunization—The consumer surplus is 
increasing with the average quantity of the vaccine supplied in both Table 1 and 2.  This 
result is intuitive and suggests that contracts designed to increase the probability of 
successful vaccine development and the quantity sold when a successful vaccine is 
developed would produce greater consumer surplus.  A direct implication from Table 2 is 
that incentive plans designed to encourage R&D through granting monopoly rights would 
not be favorable when consumer surplus is an important consideration.   
  The cost per individual successfully vaccinated (CPISV) provides another useful 
statistic for measuring the benefit provided by the subsidy relative to the cost.  Different 
from the computation of consumer surplus, the individual’s valuation of the vaccine is 
ignored in the CPISV computation.  Instead the statistic focuses on the efficacy of the 
vaccine and the number of people who receive the vaccination.  This statistic is useful 
and may be more useful than the consumer surplus statistic because of the large positive 
externality produced by each successful vaccination.  Price subsidy contracts produce 
lower CPISVs due to the larger vaccine productions they induce relative to cost subsidy 
contracts.   
Project Present Value—The present value of the project to the firm is essentially the 
transfer to the vaccine developer from the sponsor.  From Table 2, under the full 
discretionary award, of the expected 80 million dollars in subsidy to the developer only 
43.75 million dollars are expected to be used by the firm to finance the R&D, while the 
remainder 36.25 million dollars become profit.  By comparison, under the variable price   41
purchase commitment, the developer spends 73.11 million dollars of the 80 million 
dollars in expected subsidy on average to fund research, leaving only 6.89 million dollars 
as profit from accepting the R&D contract.   
Refinement of the Variable Price Purchase Commitment Plan 
From the contract analysis results reported in Table 2, the variable price purchase 
commitment plan appears to be the most effective subsidy program.  It is more attractive 
in all dimensions than other contracts except in the probability of successful vaccine 
development where the co-payment contract produces a higher probability. In this section 
we refine the variable price contract structure further. 
Variable Price Purchase Commitment Contract with Higher Sensitivity 
The variable price purchase commitment contract we studied before has a price 
sensitivity of  0.25 δ = . We now explore the contract characteristics under different 
sensitivity values.  We report the results in Table 3.  We see that by increasing the 
sensitivity, the consumer surplus decreases while the CPISV increases, suggesting that 
increasing the contract sensitivity is uniformly unattractive.  The increase in sensitivity 
skews the price schedule in favor of high efficacy vaccines, which results in lower 
revenue for borderline projects.  As a result, these borderline projects are abandoned at 
the end of Phase I R&D. 
Hybrid Subsidy Contracts 
We combine the variable price purchase commitment contract with the cost co-payment 
contract.  Under these hybrid subsidy contracts, the vaccine developer receives funding to 
offset a portion of their R&D expenditure as well as a purchase commitment on the 
developed vaccine.  We report the results for hybrid contracts in Table 4.   42
We see that by increasing the sponsor co-payment ratio of the hybrid subsidy the 
R&D activity increases, resulting in a higher probability of vaccine development.  This 
arises because co-payment directly offsets the cost of the R&D expenditure.  For every 
R&D investment dollar spent, the developer receives a rebate of X, regardless of the 
ultimate outcome of the research.  The purchase commitment, on the other hand, only 
covers the developer’s cost indirectly through price guarantees for a successful vaccine.  
The two mechanisms for offsetting R&D costs are clearly distinct in an important way 
even in our framework where risk sharing is not a motive!  The mechanism through 
which the firm is subsidized in a co-payment scheme is more effective at encouraging 
R&D activities.  Unfortunately, it is ineffective at encouraging an efficient quantity 
supplied once a successful vaccine is developed.  However, the latter problem is 
alleviated when we combine a co-payment subsidy with a purchase commitment subsidy 
into a hybrid contract. 
  Reading across Table 4, we see that the performance of the contract in the 
dimensions of consumer surplus, CPISV, expected quantity supplied, as well as the 
probability of development is monotonically increasing in the co-payment ratio.  The 
improvements over the standard variable price contract, while not large, are significant.  
Overall, we find the hybrid contracts most attractive, followed by the variable and fixed 
price contracts, and followed by the co-payment contract.  We find full discretionary 
awards largely ineffective at encouraging adequate R&D activities and find patent 
extensions completely ineffective at inducing any R&D effort. 
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Summary and Conclusions 
In this article, we develop an R&D valuation model and apply it to analyze research 
incentive contracts for sponsored pharmaceutical R&D’s.  We find that extending 
additional patent protection, which is usually effective in stimulating R&D’s in most 
environments and situations, is unlikely to induce vaccine R&D on diseases affecting the 
poor developing countries.  The small market problem is simply too severe.  Full 
discretionary research grants, which are common for basic research conducted at 
university laboratories, can spur vaccine R&D at a lower cost to the sponsor than the 
other subsidy plans analyzed in this paper.  However, the probability for developing a 
marketable vaccine is low under this subsidy program.  A more sophisticated cost subsidy 
program, where the sponsor co-pays part of the R&D investment cost, is very effective at 
encouraging R&D activities and produces a higher probability of developing a successful 
vaccine.  However, it performs poorly in supplying the vaccine in quantities once a 
successful development results.   
Price subsidy, in the form of a purchase commitment, is comparably less effective 
at encouraging high amount of R&D activities, thus resulting in a lower probability of 
successful development.  However, the sponsor can contract the purchase commitment to 
induce a socially optimal quantity to be supplied, in the event that a successful vaccine is 
developed.  These effects combined lead to a higher consumer surplus as well as lower 
cost per individual successfully vaccinated.   
Refining the variable price contract further with the incorporation of sponsor co-
payment, we find the hybrid contracts to deliver even more desirable outcomes.   
Specifically, the hybrid contract with the highest co-payment ratio outperforms all other   44
hybrid contracts; it also outperforms other non-hybrid contracts in all the effectiveness 
measures except for one.  We are therefore led to conclude that hybrid contracts and 
purchase commitment contracts are preferred to co-payment contracts.  Additionally, we 
find full discretionary awards largely ineffective at encouraging adequate R&D activities 
and find patent extensions completely ineffective at inducing any R&D effort. 
In this paper, we have assumed specific demand functions and stochastic 
processes.  However, the valuation framework we have developed and the numerical 
solutions we have implemented are quite general.  We could allow for any reasonable 
demand function and joint stochastic processes describing the conditional expected cost 
to completion and quality of the R&D output.  More R&D phases can also be considered 
without much complication.  In our analysis of the pharmaceutical R&D incentive 
designs, we have used specific functions and parameters, but we believe that the 
qualitative implications of the analysis are more general. 
There are important issues that we do not consider in our analysis.  Specifically, 
we do not model the interesting and complicated issues of moral hazard and information 
asymmetry between the vaccine developer and the research sponsor.  However, it does 
appear intuitive to us that the inclusion of moral hazard would make cost subsidy 
programs such as full discretionary research grants and sponsor co-payments less 
effective relative to the purchase commitment program in producing the desired level of 
R&D activity in the targeted vaccine. 
Another issue of interest is the analysis of competition in the development of 
vaccines.  What is the impact on the expected cost to the research sponsor and the 
probability of vaccine development under the different incentive programs when more   45
than one firm engages in the same vaccine R&D?  How should the incentive contracts be 
modified to target sponsor cost and/or the probability of success?  Answers to these 
questions will further aid world organizations to effectively solve the health care crises in 
the developing countries.  
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Figure 1.  At time 0, the firm forms expectations on the cost to complete Phase I R&D, 
Phase II R&D, and the quality of the R&D output.  When Phase I R&D is completed, the 
firm learns (partially) about its ability to develop the product profitably.  With this 
knowledge, it revises its expectation on the cost to complete Phase II R&D and the 
quality of the R&D output.  The decision to continue is then formed based on these new 
expectations.  If the R&D is continued into Phase II, upon its completion, the firm 
observes the exact quality of the R&D output.  Income from bringing the product to 
market is forecasted, and the firm makes decision to shelf or to commence production. 
time 0 
1 τ   τ τ + T 




Product earns zero 
profit (patent expires) 
Rate of R&D 
investment = I1 
Rate of R&D 
investment = I2 
DECISION NODE #1:  Firm decides 
whether to invest in the project based on 
the expected Phase I & II R&D costs and 
the projected income from 
commercializing the R&D output. 
DECISION NODE #2:  Firm decides 
whether to continue the R&D effort based 
on its new expectations on the Phase II cost 
and the projected income from 
commercializing the R&D output. 
DECISION NODE #3:  Firm decides 
whether to bring the product to market 




Figure 2.  The simulated probability density function of the Phase I R&D time  1 τ  is 
plotted here.  The mean of the distribution is 2.5 years, and the standard deviation is 0.4 
years.  The skewness of the distribution is 0.48 (right skewed) and the excess kurtosis is 
0.38 (more peaked than normal distribution). 
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Figure 3.  The simulated probability density function of the Phase II R&D time  2 τ  is 
plotted here.  The mean of the distribution is 4 years, and the standard deviation is 1 year.  
The skewness of the distribution is 0.53 (right skewed) and the excess kurtosis is 0.45 
(more peaked than normal distribution). 
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Figure 4.  The time  1 τ  probability density function of the expected quality of the final 
product, Q( 1 τ ), is plotted here for the median completion time  1 τ  and the bottom 10 
percentile and 90 percentile  1 τ .  Recall that the mean of Q( 1 τ ) depends inversely on  1 τ , 
while the variance depends positively on  1 τ .  The 90 percentile  1 τ , which indicates a 
significantly shorter R&D completion time for Phase I, would have a tighter distribution 
as well as a higher expected quality than the median and the bottom 10 percentile 
completion time. 
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Figure 5.  The time τ  probability density function of the quality of the final product, 
Q(τ ), is plotted here for the median prior expectation Q( 1 τ ) and the bottom 10 percentile 
and 90 percentile Q( 1 τ ).  Recall that the mean of Q(τ ) depends both on Q( 1 τ ) as well as 
2 τ .  However, the effect from  2 τ  is small in comparison to Q( 1 τ ).  The 90 percentile 
Q( 1 τ ) naturally has a higher expected quality than the median and the bottom 10 
percentile.  However, it also has a slightly lower variance as a consequence of the 
bounded support of the Beta distribution. 
 




Figure 6.  The simulated unconditional probability density function of the quality of the 
final product, Q( 1 τ ), is plotted here.  The mean of the distribution is 0.75, and the 
standard deviation is 0.1.  The skewness of the distribution is -0.53 (left skewed) and the 
excess kurtosis is 0.15 (more peaked than normal distribution). 
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Figure 7.  The simulated unconditional probability density function of the quality of the 
final product, Q(τ ), is plotted here.  The mean of the distribution is 0.75, and the 
standard deviation is 0.11.  The skewness of the distribution is -0.54 (left skewed) and the 
excess kurtosis is 0.08 (more peaked than normal distribution). 
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Figure 8.  The inverse demand functions, 
21 /
min max( ,0) PQ Q q
γ α
− =⋅ − ⋅ , with α =1500, 
min Q =0.7, and the demand elasticity γ =1.2 is plotted for four different final product 
qualities are plotted here.  In general lower quality products have lower market clearing 
prices given the same quantity.  In addition, note that the market is willing to pay 
significantly more for better quality products.  At a quantity of 20 million units supplied, 
the marginal consumer is only willing to pay $2 additional for an increase in quality from 
80% to 85%.  However, he is willing to pay $3 additional for an increase in quality from 
90% to 95%. 
 




Figure 9.  The pharmaceutical firm’s project value at the end of the Phase I R&D is 
plotted here.  Note that the project value depends on both the expected vaccine efficacy 
Q( 1 τ ) as well as the expected Phase II cost  21 () K τ .  Note further that Q( 1 τ ) and  21 () K τ  
are unconditionally negatively correlated—a higher than expected  1 τ  tends to lower 
Q( 1 τ ) but increase  21 () K τ . 
 




Figure 10.1.  The simulated unconditional probability density function of the quality of 
the final product, Q( 1 τ ), is plotted here.  This plot serves to benchmark the conditional 
probability density functions in the next few plots. 
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Figure 10.2.  The simulated conditional (conditional on no abandonment at the end of 
Phase I R&D) probability density function of the quality of the final product, Q( 1 τ ), is 
plotted here.  Recall that the minimum quality demanded by the market is 70%.   
However, the firm must incur additional expenditure in Phase II R&D.  Therefore, if a 
vaccine project is barely more effective than the minimum efficacy, it will be rejected at 
the end of Phase I R&D.   59
 
 
Figure 10.3.  The simulated conditional (conditional on no abandonment at the end of 
Phase I R&D) probability density function of the quality of the final product, Q(τ ), is 
plotted here.  This distribution is the distribution in Figure 10.2 dispersed over time.  
Note that there is still significant probability for a vaccine which enters Phase II R&D to 
turn out to be unmarketable (efficacy lower than 70%). 
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Figure 10.4.  The simulated conditional (conditional on entering production at the end of 
Phase II R&D) probability density function of the quality of the final product, Q(τ ), is 
plotted here. 
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Constant Price Purchase 
Commitment Plan
Variable Price Purchase 
Commitment Plan 
(δ=0.25)
Sponsor PV Cost -43.75 -58.77 -65.97 -72.09
Firm's Project PV 0000
CPISV -5.6755 -1.8140 -0.5088 -0.5182
Expected Consumer Surplus 3.99 6.69 11.84 12.76
Average Quantity Supplied 0.56 2.38 9.48 10.21
Probability of Successful 
Vaccine Development
3.46% 41.57% 32.61% 41.13%
Average Vaccine Efficacy (if 
successful)
91.95% 84.45% 85.49% 84.51%
Probability of Advancing to 
Phase II R&D 
3.47% 42.59% 32.61% 42.10%  62




























Constant Price Purchase 
Commitment Plan
Variable Price Purchase 
Commitment Plan 
(δ=0.25)
Sponsor PV Cost -80 -80 -80 -80
Firm's Project PV 36.25 11.48 12.72 6.89
CPISV -10.38 -2.351 -0.6051 -0.5709
Expected Consumer Surplus 3.985 7.048 12.09 12.86
Average Quantity Supplied 0.5589 2.506 9.671 10.29
Probability of Successful 
Vaccine Development
3.464% 54.82% 34.65% 42.51%
Average Vaccine Efficacy (if 
successful)
92.0% 82.87% 85.19% 84.33%
Probability of Advancing to 
Phase II R&D 
3.466% 58.56% 34.65% 43.64%  63























Sponsor PV Cost -80 -80 -80 -80 -80
Firm's Project PV 6.89 7.15 7.63 8.35 9.3
CPISV -0.5709 -0.5717 -0.5735 -0.5771 -0.5819
Expected Consumer Surplus 12.86 12.84 12.79 12.71 12.60
Average Quantity Supplied 10.29 10.27 10.24 10.17 10.08
Probability of Successful 
Vaccine Development
42.51% 42.15% 41.47% 40.40% 39.01%
Average Vaccine Efficacy (if 
successful)
84.33% 84.38% 84.48% 84.61% 84.81%
Probability of Advancing to 
Phase II R&D 
43.64% 43.23% 42.46% 41.30% 39.77%  64













Variable Price Purchase 
Commitment with 0% 
Co-payment
Variable Price Purchase 
Commitment with 50% 
Co-payment
Variable Price Purchase 
Commitment with 75% 
Co-payment
Variable Price Purchase 
Commitment with 90% 
Co-payment
Sponsor PV Cost -80 -80 -80 -80
Firm's Project PV 6.89 6.23 5.29 3.81
CPISV -0.5709 -0.5681 -0.5646 -0.5600
Expected Consumer Surplus 12.86 12.92 13.01 13.13
Average Quantity Supplied 10.29 10.34 10.41 10.5
Probability of Successful 
Vaccine Development
42.51% 43.42% 44.69% 46.62%
Average Vaccine Efficacy (if 
successful)
84.33% 84.22% 84.06% 83.83%
Probability of Advancing to 
Phase II R&D 
43.64% 44.64% 46.08% 48.34%